How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation? An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced Decision Modes by Nina Horstmann et al.
MAX PLANCK SOCIETY
Preprints of the
Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods
Bonn 2009/10
How Distinct are Intuition 
and Deliberation?





Andreas GlöcknerPreprints of the 
Max Planck Institute 
for Research on Collective Goods  Bonn 2009/10
How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation?
An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced 
Decision Modes
Nina Horstmann / Andrea Ahlgrimm / Andreas Glöckner
März 2009
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn 
http://www.coll.mpg.de1 
How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation? 
An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced Decision Modes 






In recent years, numerous studies comparing intuition and deliberation have been published. 
However, until now relatively little is known about the cognitive processes underlying the two 
decision modes. Therefore, we analyzed processes of information search and integration using 
eye-tracking technology. We tested hypotheses derived from dual-process models which postu-
late that intuition and deliberation are completely distinct processes against predictions of inter-
ventionist models. The latter assume that intuitive and deliberate decisions are based on the same 
basic process which is supplemented by additional processes in the deliberate decision mode. We 
manipulated decision mode between-participants by means of instructions and participants com-
pleted simple and complex city-size tasks as well as complex legal inference tasks. Our findings 
indicate that the instruction to deliberate does not necessarily increase levels of processing. We 
found no difference in mean fixation duration and the distribution of short, medium and long 
fixations. Instruction-induced deliberation led to a higher number of fixations, a more complete 
information search and more repeated information investigations. Overall, the data support inter-
ventionist models suggesting that decisions mainly rely on automatic processes which are sup-
plemented by additional operations in the deliberate decision mode.  
Keywords: Decision Making, Decision Mode, Intuition, Deliberation, Eye-Tracking 
 
                                        
*   Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to: Andreas Glöckner, Max Planck Institute for 
Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, Phone: +49-(0) 2 28 /  
9 14 16 857, E-mail: gloeckner@coll.mpg.de 
 2 
Introduction 
According to commonly-held assumptions, individuals sometimes make decisions deliberately 
and sometimes rely on their intuition or gut feeling. Although a distinction between the two 
types of information processing is now highly accepted in judgment and decision making (JDM) 
research (for a critical review, see Evans, 2008), relatively little is known about the cognitive or 
affective processes that underlie them. This is particularly the case for the intuitive decision 
mode. Different models that rely on automatic processes might be considered to account for in-
tuition. These models range from mainly cognitive evidence accumulation (Busemeyer & Town-
send, 1993), sampling (Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Fiedler, 2008) or network models 
(Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; Holyoak & Simon, 1999) to more 
affect-based approaches (Damasio, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). Fur-
thermore, numerous theories modeling the interplay between intuitive and deliberate processes 
exist. There is a long tradition of dual-process models that postulate a clear distinction between 
intuition and deliberation. As Kahneman and Frederick (2002) pointed out, “dual-process models 
come in many flavors, but all distinguish cognitive operations that are quick and associative from 
others that are slow and rule-governed” (p. 51). For instance, mode selection models imply that 
there is an initial selection between two rather distinct kinds of processes (Chen & Chaiken, 
1999; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Other models postulate a concurrent activation of two distinct 
systems and a kind of competition among them (Sloman, 2002). In contrast, so-called default-
interventionist models (Evans, 2007, 2008) state that intuition is always activated first as a de-
fault mode and deliberate processes may intervene upon these intuitive processes. In a similar 
vein, network models argue that automatic processes build the basis of every decision and are 
only supplemented by deliberate processes if necessary (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; cf. Rumel-
hart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). The latter view implies that the processes under-
lying different modes of decision making might only be partially distinct and that basic auto-
matic processes should be observed in a deliberate decision mode as well. In an early work, 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) already suggested that intuition and deliberation 
are not completely distinct categories of cognitive processes between which people switch. 
Rather, they are seen as poles of a cognitive continuum, and task factors influence how far one 
moves toward one or the other pole. In the present study, we analyzed, on a fine-grained level, 
how the instruction to decide intuitively or deliberately affects information search and integra-
tion using eye-tracking technology. We aimed to show that intuitive and deliberate decisions are 
not clearly distinct and that the instruction to deliberate does not lead to completely different 
processes of rule-based decision making, but that deliberation only adds to the automatic proc-
esses. 
Obviously, many different factors, including the context of the decision task, might influence the 
selection and processing of decision modes. We focused our investigation on probabilistic infer-
ence tasks (e.g., Bröder, 2000), in which judgments are made about options based on a set of 
dichotomous probabilistic cues that differ in their validity (i.e., predictive accuracy, defined as 
conditional probability that the option has a higher value on the criterion given a positive cue 3 
value; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991). The structure of probabilistic inference 
tasks allows for different information integration processes which, in a paramorphic perspective 
(Hoffman, 1960), can be described by different weighting schemes for cues. According to a lexi-
cographic strategy (LEX, Fishburn, 1974), individuals select the option that is highest on the 
most valid differentiating cue by weighting this particular cue higher than the sum of all less 
valid cues. Individuals can also apply an equal weight strategy (EQW, Fishburn, 1974). They 
decide by counting how many cues speak for each option, and hence implicitly give the same 
weight to all cues, i.e., ignore their validity. Finally, individuals can weight all cues differently, 
for instance according to their validity, and integrate them in a weighted additive manner 
(WADD, Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Note that LEX and EQW are of course sub-models 
of WADD with specific restricted weights (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a). For the sake of simplic-
ity, we will nevertheless refer to them as separate “strategies” here.  
The different cue-weighting schemes are theoretically independent from the application of intui-
tive or deliberate processes. In line with Hammond et al. (1987), many findings in JDM research 
indicate that intuition relies on the integration of cues according to a WADD scheme (Doherty & 
Brehmer, 1997; see also Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c). As a dissenting 
opinion it has, however, also been argued that simple heuristics based on LEX or EQW schemes 
might be the core of intuition (Gigerenzer, 2007): “Good intuitions ignore information. Gut feel-
ings spring from rules of thumb that extract only a few pieces of information from a complex 
environment (…) and ignore the rest” (p. 38). There is also a controversial debate if and under 
which circumstances intuition or deliberation lead to ‘good’ decisions (Acker, 2008; Dijkster-
huis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). In our investigation, we refrained from continuing 
this debate on decision quality, but focused on process properties which have been mainly ne-
glected so far. 
Fixation Duration and Cognitive Processes 
It has been shown that classic decision paradigms such as Mouselab (Payne et al., 1988) some-
times hinder the application of intuitive processes by limiting information search and not allow-
ing for quick comparisons between information (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008c). Eye-tracking is a 
less intrusive alternative to record information search, which we employed in our study. More-
over, and critically, eye-tracking records single fixation durations. This parameter is a reliable 
proxy for levels of processing, in that fixation duration increases with increasing levels of proc-
essing (Pomplun, Ritter, & Velichkovsky, 1996; see also Rayner, 1998; Velichkovsky, 1999; 
Velichkovsky, Rothert, Kopf, Dornhofer, & Joos, 2002). In a search-for-a-difference task, 
Velichkovsky, Challis, and Pomplun (1995) could, for instance, demonstrate that the temporal 
parameters of eye-movements can be separated into two phases. In an early phase of automatic 
information search and scanning, participants show mainly short fixations, whereas in a later 
phase, “when the crucial difference is about to be found, the fixation durations rise to 500 ms and 
more. […] Obviously, this final phase of visual search can be attributed to some higher level of 4 
cognitive processing, which culminates in a conscious decision” (Velichkovsky, 1999, p. 214). 
For the domain of language processing, Rayner (1998) summarizes in a similar vein that more 
automatic processes like silent reading lead to shorter fixations than more effortful processes 
such as typing. Cognitive processes comprising conscious mathematical steps of information 
integration should therefore go along with long fixations, whereas scanning and automatic proc-
esses should mainly produce short fixations. To test this crucial assumption, in a pre-study we 
instructed participants to deliberately apply a WADD strategy by calculating weighted sums in a 
city-size task. In line with our hypothesis, long fixations (> 500 ms) occurred very often (see 
Figure 1). These pre-study results suggest that fixation duration is a reliable parameter for levels 




Figure 1. Example of a scanpath for a participant instructed to calculate weighted sums in a simple  
city-size task. Fixations are illustrated by circles and circle diameter indicates fixation duration. The lines 
represent saccades.  
Detailed Research Questions and Model Predictions 
The purpose of our study was to investigate how the instruction to decide intuitively or deliber-
ately affects process parameters of information search and integration. We tested whether intui-
tive and deliberate decisions induced by instruction are indeed based on very different and sepa-
rable processes, as implied by traditional dual-processing models: do persons really switch be-
tween a deliberate serial and rule-based integration of information as indicated by long fixations, 
on the one hand, and automatic-intuitive processes that go along with short fixations due to quick 
holistic information scanning, on the other hand? Or is decision behavior more in line with de-
fault-interventionist and network models stating a common automatic process which underlies all 
kinds of decision making and is only supplemented with additional processing steps in the delib-
erate decision mode?    
As mentioned above, according to traditional dual-process models a clear distinction between 
intuitive and deliberate decision modes is assumed. Intuitive processes, on the one hand, are de-5 
scribed as unconscious, automatic, fast, parallel, effortless, and having a high capacity. Deliber-
ate processes, on the other hand, are thought to be accessible to conscious awareness, slow, se-
quential, effortful, rule-governed and having a limited capacity (see Evans, 2008).  
Hence, in a hypothetical pure deliberate decision mode, information is likely to be investigated 
in a stepwise manner and it should be directly integrated because of working memory capacity 
constraints. Such a process would be similar to conscious mathematical calculation that we in-
vestigated in our pre-study. In contrast, intuition should be based on less controlled, fast informa-
tion integration processes. However, default-interventionist models postulate the primacy of in-
tuitive processes which are always activated as a default mode (Evans, 2006; Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008b).  Network models, in particular, assume that there is not necessarily a clear dis-
tinction between decision behavior if individuals are instructed to use one or the other mode.  
According to these models, a pure deliberate decision mode does not exist.  Intuitive automatic 
processes are always activated in advance and/or simultaneously, and they are only supple-
mented by additional deliberate processes.  Consequently, we expect that persons supposedly 
deciding “deliberately” do something completely different than integrating information in a se-
rial and rule-based manner or using mathematical calculation: They extend intuitive processes by 
increasing information search and adding repeated inspections of previously seen information.  
For reasons of simplicity, we will label the latter class of models “interventionist models”.  
Taking for granted that individuals comply with instructions to decide intuitively or deliberately, 
we examined effects on well-established eye-tracking parameters, namely the fixation duration, 
the number of fixations, and corresponding indices such as the amount of inspected information, 
the number of repeated information inspections, and the direction of information search as well 
as information integration strategies. For these dependent measures, we generated the following 
hypotheses for the traditional dual-process view and for the interventionist models.   
Fixation duration. According to classic dual-process models, in a deliberate decision mode indi-
viduals should judge or decide in a serial way. Because of working memory capacity constraints, 
information is likely to be investigated in a stepwise manner and should be directly integrated. 
Hence, in a pure deliberate decision mode a sequence of long fixations would be expected, simi-
lar to the pattern of long fixations we observed in our pre-study when instructing participants to 
calculate weighted sums. Short fixations should be rare. In contrast, intuition should be based on 
less controlled, fast information integration processes. Thus, intuitive decisions should go along 
with predominantly short fixation durations. From an interventionist model perspective, intuitive 
automatic processes are always activated when making a decision. Deliberation only adds to this 
basic process and a pure deliberate decision mode does not exist. Because of the underlying 
automatic processes, short fixations should prevail in both decision modes. Taking into account 
that supplementary processing steps in the deliberate decision mode could result in longer in-
spections of single information, a higher number of long fixations might be observed under the 
instruction to deliberate. However, due to the primacy of automatic processes there should be no 
dramatic shift in fixation durations under the instruction to decide deliberately as compared to 
the instruction to decide intuitively. 6 
Number of fixations. To make specific predictions concerning the number of fixations it is useful 
to distinguish between the amount of inspected information and the number of repeated informa-
tion inspections, because the number of fixations obviously increases with both factors. As we 
outline in the following, from a traditional dual-process view the amount of inspected informa-
tion and the number of repeated information inspections is assumed to be lower in the deliberate 
decision mode compared to the intuitive decision mode. Therefore, the number of fixations 
should be lower in a pure deliberate decision mode. In contrast, according to interventionist 
models, a higher amount of inspected information and a higher number of repeated information 
inspections are expected under the instruction to deliberate. Consequently, also a higher number 
of fixations should be observed in the deliberate decision mode.  
Amount of inspected information. As postulated by classic dual-process models, the capacity of 
the deliberate decision mode is limited compared to the intuitive mode. Therefore, the amount of 
inspected information should be lower under the instruction to deliberate than under the instruc-
tion to decide intuitively. Assuming that intuitive and deliberate decision modes build on a simi-
lar basic process of quick information search and automatic scanning as postulated by interven-
tionist models, the amount of inspected information should at least be equal in both decision 
modes. Taking additional processing steps into consideration that extend this basic process, the 
amount of inspected information could even be higher under the instruction to deliberate.  
Repeated information inspections. From a classic dual-process perspective, relatively few re-
peated information inspections should be observed in the deliberate decision mode because it is 
assumed that information is searched in a serial manner and is directly integrated. According to 
interventionist models, intuitive and deliberate decisions are based on a similar basic process 
which is supplemented by additional processing steps in the deliberate decision mode. These 
additional processes might be repeated information investigations that could result in general 
double-ckecking or detailed investigation of specific pieces of information. That is, the instruc-
tion to deliberate should increase the number of repeated information inspections compared to 
the intuitive condition.  
Direction of information search and information integration strategies. Taking a merely explora-
tory account, we furthermore examined whether the direction of information search (i.e., cue-
wise vs. option-wise) also depends on decision mode. Additionally, we investigated choices and 
analyzed whether decision mode is related to the usage of simplified (LEX/TTB) or complex 
(WADD) cue-weighting schemes.  
In a comprehensive eye-tracking study, we tested these hypotheses and research questions in the 
classic city-size task, using different levels of complexity (Part 1), and in complex content-rich 
legal inference tasks (Part 2; see Table 1). It has been shown that task complexity is a crucial 
factor for the application of decision strategies, as it considerably increases the costs of deliber-
ately applying strategies (Payne et al., 1988). This is particularly the case for strategies that rely 
on complex weighting schemes (e.g., WADD), whereas simple strategies (e.g., LEX) are influ-
enced less strongly. Hence, from a merely deliberate perspective, everything else being equal, 7 
the increase of complexity should lead to the application of simpler strategies. On the other hand, 
when taking into account intuitive processes, increasing complexity might not have such a strong 
effect on cue-weighting schemes (cf. Dijksterhuis et al., 2006); it might, however, influence 
strategies of information search in explicit information display-boards. Hence, we investigated 
task complexity in Part 1 of our study. A second issue concerns the generalization of findings 
from simple, somewhat artificial settings to more content-rich domains, because intuition might 
be more domain-specific. It might, for instance, be argued that intuition is particularly and suc-
cessfully applied in content-rich settings in which stories can be constructed, such as legal deci-
sion tasks (but see Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, under review; cf. Pennington & Hastie, 1992; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1993). Accordingly, we also investigated decision behavior in a content-
rich legal setting in Part 2 of the study. Note that all our participants worked on both parts and 
we counterbalanced order. For pragmatic reasons, we report the results of both parts separately, 
starting with the part concerning our complexity manipulation. 
Table 1 
Overview of Experimental Design for Part 1 and 2 
 
  Manipulation of Decision Mode 
(Intuition vs. Deliberation) 
Task Characteristics  Part 1  Part 2 
material  city-size task  legal task 
complexity  high vs. low  high 
 
Study – Part 1: Manipulation of Decision Mode in Simple and Complex 
City-Size Tasks 
Method 
Participants and design. Twenty students with different majors from the University of Bonn par-
ticipated in the study which was part of a one-hour experimental battery. They were paid a flat 
fee of €18 for participation. Participants completed different decision tasks and, besides standard 
behavioral measures, information search was recorded using eye-tracking technology. The Deci-
sion Mode was manipulated between-participants with respect to intuition and deliberation. Ad-
ditionally, the Complexity of the tasks was varied within-participants regarding simple and com-
plex decision tasks.  
Materials and procedure. The experiment comprised 20 probabilistic inferences using city-size 
decision tasks (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Participants were asked to decide which of 
two cities has more inhabitants, on the basis of probabilistic cues. Participants were informed 8 
that probabilistic inferences rested upon real German cities. To eliminate previous knowledge, 
options were presented with artificial names (e.g., “City A”). Cue value information was given in 
a binary format, “plus” indicating the existence of the cue (e.g., the city has an airport) or “mi-
nus” denoting the non-existence of the cue (e.g., the city has no first-league soccer team). Com-
plexity was manipulated by the number of cues available from simple (3 cues) to high (12 cues; 
see Appendix B).  
First, participants were introduced to the cues and memorized abbreviated cue labels, followed 
by a paper-based assessment of subjective cue validities (i.e., the conditional probability that one 
of two cities is bigger given a certain cue). They rated the subjective validity of each cue on a 
scale ranging from 50 to 100 percent and subsequently were familiarized with the decision task. 
Participants in the deliberate condition were instructed to balance reasons before making their 
decision. In contrast, participants in the intuitive condition were instructed to decide fast and 
spontaneously and in correspondence with their gut feeling (for complete instructions, see Ap-
pendix A). In the literature, these kinds of instructions are frequently used to manipulate decision 
modes (see Horstmann, Hausmann & Ryf, in press, for an overview).  
The decision tasks were presented on a computer screen in a fixed-random order. Each decision 
trial started with a blank screen (3 s), followed by a fixation cross (1 s), which was located in the 
middle of the screen. Then, the decision task was presented in a matrix-format (see Appendix B) 
and simple and complex decision tasks alternated in a fixed-random order. Cues were sorted in a 
fixed-random order which was held constant over all trials. Participants selected one option by 
pressing a marked key on the left (“y”) or right (“m”) side of the keyboard.  
Eye-movements were recorded using the Eyegaze binocular system (LC Technologies), with 
remote binocular sampling rate of 120 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45°. The system is based 
on pupil-center/corneal reflection method to determine eyegaze. This method captures voluntary, 
saccadic eye movements that fixate a target object on fovea. An infrared-sensitive video camera, 
positioned below the computer monitor, observes the participant’s eye and specialized image 
software generates x, y coordinates for the gaze point on the monitor screen. Images were pre-
sented on a 17-inch color monitor (Samsung Synchmaster 740B, refresh rate 60 Hz, reaction 
time 5 ms) with a native resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels. Viewed from a distance of 60 cm, the 
screen subtended a visual angle of 28° horizontally and 21° vertically. Fixations were identified 
using a fixation radius of 20 pixels and a minimum fixation duration of 50 ms. Before starting 
the experiment, a 9-point calibration routine was executed.  
Choices, decision times, and basic eye-tracking parameters such as fixation duration, number of 
fixations, and coordinates were recorded. To avoid methodological artifacts, first fixations were 
excluded for each decision trial. We defined non-overlapping areas of interest (AOIs) around 
each cell in the matrix, each containing one piece of information (i.e., option labels, cue labels or 
cue values). Hence, we obtained 12 AOIs with the size of 426 x 256 pixels for simple tasks and 
39 AOIs with the size of 426 x 78 pixels for complex tasks. For each participant and each deci-
sion the number of fixations within each AOI was calculated. AOIs were used to determine the 9 
amount of inspected information and whether participants inspected AOIs repeatedly. Further-
more, all direct transitions of fixations between AOIs containing cue value information were 
coded to identify direction of information search. Single fixations were categorized in short 
(<  150 ms), medium (≥ 150 and < 500 ms) and long (≥ 500 ms) fixation durations 
(Velichkovsky, 1999) resulting in the variable Time Category. In general, all statistical analyses 
reported below did not include fixations to AOIs with cue or option labels, because we wanted to 
separate pure information search processes from reading.  
Results 
To illustrate a typical pattern of eye-movements for a decision in the intuitive and deliberate 
condition, we exemplarily show two individual scanpaths (see Figure 2). The scanpath examples 
in Figure 2 look rather similar concerning fixation durations (i.e., indicated by the diameter of 
the circles). The instruction to deliberate obviously just lead to an increase in the number of fixa-
tions and repeated information inspections. Under the instruction to deliberate, single fixation 
durations were much shorter than one would expect for deliberate calculation strategies (cf. Fig-
ure 1). We found very few long fixations (≥ 500 ms) which would indicate a high level of proc-
essing, as observed when individuals were instructed to calculate weighted sums. Hence, on a 
descriptive level, the data are more in line with the assumptions of interventionist models. Next, 
the corresponding statistical analyses are reported in detail.  
   
                 
Figure 2. Example of scanpaths in a simple city-size task under the instruction to decide intuitively (left) 
and deliberately (right). Fixations are illustrated by circles and circle diameter indicates fixation duration. 
The lines represent saccades.  
 
Manipulation check / decision time. To determine whether our manipulation of Decision Mode 
was efficient, we analyzed individuals’ decision times (cf. De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 
2008; Finucane et al., 2000). A 2 (Decision Mode) x 2 (Complexity) x 10 (Task) repeated-
measurement ANOVA was conducted with log-transformed decision time as dependent variable 
and Complexity and Task as within-participants factors. The factor Task represented different 10 
decision task patterns which were nested under the factor Complexity. The main effect of Deci-
sion Mode was significant, with participants in the intuitive condition deciding faster compared 
to participants in the deliberate condition, F(1, 18) = 5.17, p < .05, η
2 = .22 (for all descriptive 
statistics see Table 2). This indicates that our manipulation was successful. Additionally, a sig-
nificant main effect of Complexity was found, F(1, 18) = 334.64, p < .001, η
2 = .95. Participants 
decided more slowly in complex tasks, as compared to the simple ones.  
Fixation duration. The duration of single fixations is an important indicator for the levels of 
processing. Hence, in a first step we analyzed fixation duration by conducting a 2 (Decision 
Mode) x 2 (Complexity) ANOVA with log-transformed single fixation duration as dependent 
variable (and Participants as additional random factor accounting for the repeated-measurement 
design). Interestingly, there was no difference concerning mean single fixation duration between 
the intuitive and deliberate condition, F(1, 18.2) = .04, p = .85, η
2 = .002. A significant main ef-
fect of Complexity was found, revealing a longer fixation duration in complex tasks, F(1, 19.6) = 
16.38, p = .001, η
2 = .45.  
To investigate the influence of Decision Mode on single fixation duration in more detail, we 
tested for differences in the overall proportion of short, medium, and long fixations. χ
2-tests of 
independence between Decision Mode and Time Category were calculated separately for simple 
and complex tasks with number of short, medium, and long fixations averaged across partici-
pants. In both complexity conditions, the decision mode manipulation did not influence the dis-
tribution of single fixation duration, simple tasks: χ
2(2, N = 265) = .99, p = .61, ŵ
2 = .003, com-
plex tasks: χ
2(2, N = 857) = .05, p = .97, ŵ
2 < .001. Overall, fixations of the medium time cate-
gory prevailed, accounting for 67 percent of fixations. Furthermore, short fixations represented 
31 percent of fixations, while long fixations (2 percent) were rarely observed (see Figure 3).  
To test whether the distribution of single fixation duration varies over time, we looked at fixa-
tions divided in consecutive blocks of 10 fixations. We included all fixation blocks containing 
fixations of at least 25 percent of the participants. Over the decision mode and complexity condi-
tions, the proportion of short fixations ranged from 25 to 35 percent. Medium and long fixations 
accounted for 65 to 74 percent, and 1 to 4 percent of the fixations, respectively. This finding in-



























































































Figure 3. Number of short, medium, and long fixations averaged across participants and tasks for  
complexity and decision mode conditions in Part 1. Bar labels indicate the proportion of fixations for  
each category.  
 
Number of fixations. One of the basic indicators for information integration processes in eye-
tracking studies is the total number of fixations. Therefore, we analyzed the total number of fixa-
tions to AOIs containing cue value information. A 2 (Decision Mode) x 2 (Complexity) x 10 
(Task) repeated-measurement ANOVA was conducted to analyze the average amount of fixa-
tions per decision task. The main effect of Decision Mode turned out to be significant, F(1, 18) = 
8.17, p < .05, η
2 = .31. In the deliberate condition a significantly higher number of fixations was 
observed compared to the intuitive condition. Moreover, a significant main effect of Complexity 
was found, F(1, 18) = 149.80, p < .001, η
2 = .89, revealing a higher number of fixations in com-
plex tasks. Furthermore, the interaction between Complexity and Decision Mode turned out to be 
significant, F(1, 18) = 5.38, p < .05, η
2 = .23. In complex tasks the difference in number of fixa-
tions between the intuitive and deliberate condition became more pronounced.  
Amount of inspected information. Concerning the question which proportion of the information 
was indeed taken into account when making a decision, the total number of fixations reported 
above is only partially meaningful. We therefore calculated an information inspection index 
which denotes the proportion of information the participants attended to before reaching their 
decisions. This index was computed by dividing the number of AOIs, inspected at least once, by 
the total number of AOIs with cue value information (i.e., “plus” or “minus”). A 2 (Decision 
Mode) x 2 (Complexity) x 10 (Task) repeated-measurement ANOVA was conducted to analyze 
this inspection index. The main effect of Decision Mode was significant, with participants in the 
deliberate condition searching for more information, F(1, 18) = 6.52, p < .05, η
2 = .27. More-
over, in simple tasks, the percentage of inspected information was higher compared to complex 
tasks, F(1, 18) = 35.11, p < .001, η
2 = .66. Interestingly, even participants in the intuitive condi-
tion attended to more than two thirds of the cue value information before deciding. 12 
Number of repeated information inspections. To account for the fact that information is often 
repeatedly attended to in the decision process, an analysis of repeated cue value inspections was 
conducted. Repeated inspections were defined as fixations that did not directly follow each other, 
but were located in the same AOI. A 2 (Decision Mode) x 2 (Complexity) x 10 (Task) repeated-
measurement ANOVA was computed, with number of repeated inspections as dependent vari-
able. The main effect of Decision Mode turned out to be significant, F(1, 18) = 9.01, p < .01, η
2 
= .33. Participants who were instructed to deliberate showed a higher number of repeated inspec-
tions of previously fixated information than participants deciding intuitively. Furthermore, com-
plex tasks were associated with a higher number of repeated inspections than simple tasks, F(1, 
18) = 57.68, p < .001, η
2 = .76. Additionally, the interaction between Decision Mode and Com-
plexity was significant, F(1, 18) = 5.93, p < .05, η
2 = .25, indicating stronger differences between 
the intuitive and deliberate condition with regard to the number of repeated inspections in com-
plex tasks.  
Direction of information search. Different decision strategies are claimed to be associated with 
different directions of information search. It is usually assumed that non-compensatory strategies 
such as LEX are related to cue-wise information search, whereas compensatory strategies such 
as WADD are linked to more option-wise information search (Payne et al., 1988). The direction 
of information search was analyzed on the basis of the SM-index (Böckenholt & Hynan, 1994). 
This index takes the probabilities of cue- and option-wise transitions into account and therefore 
describes information selection strategies as standardized deviations from a random search pat-
tern. Additionally, the SM-index considers the number of “other” transitions (i.e., not strictly 
cue- or option-wise transitions) and therefore allows for a more precise classification of a search 
pattern than the classical Payne-index (Payne, 1976). Negative SM-values indicate a cue-wise 
and positive SM-values an option-wise information search. To investigate differences in infor-
mation search direction with regard to decision mode, a 2 (Decision Mode) x 2 (Complexity) x 
10 (Task) repeated-measurement ANOVA was calculated with SM-index as dependent variable. 
The main effect of Decision Mode was significant, F(1, 18) = 4.56, p < .05, η
2 = .20. In both 
conditions a cue-wise information search prevailed, but participants in the deliberate condition 
showed this search direction to a higher extent. Furthermore, a significant main effect of Com-
plexity was found indicating a tendency to search more cue-wise in complex tasks, F(1, 18) = 
56.02, p < .001, η
2 = .76. Additionally, the interaction between Decision Mode and Complexity 
turned out to be significant, F(1, 18) = 6.68, p < .05, η
2 = .27. In complex tasks, the difference in 
SM-Index between the intuitive and deliberate condition became more pronounced.  
Information integration strategies. To test whether Decision Mode influences information inte-
gration, we classified strategy utilization separately for complexity conditions by means of the 
linear scoring rule regarding WADD, LEX, and EQW (Bröder, in press). According to this clas-
sification method, empirical and expected choices corresponding to each strategy are compared. 
This comparison is done for every participant and decision task. If there is a match between em-
pirical choice and choice predicted by the particular strategy, no points are assigned to the re-
spective participant and task regarding this strategy. If empirical and expected choices diverge, 13 
two points are ascribed. For strategies making no prediction for a particular task one point is as-
signed. Finally, the points are summed up separately for each strategy and the participant is clas-
sified as a user of the strategy with the lowest score. Corrected, subjective cue validities were 
used to calculate expected choices. According to Glöckner and Betsch (2008c), we corrected cue 
weights for the fact that a cue with a validity of 50 percent has no predictive power (wcue = pcue - 
.50). Concerning simple tasks, in the intuitive condition, six participants were classified as 
WADD users, two participants as LEX users and two participants could not be classified. With 
regard to the deliberate condition five participants were classified as WADD users, two partici-
pants as LEX users and three participants as EQW users. In complex tasks, in the intuitive condi-
tion, one participant was classified as a WADD user, three participants as LEX users and six par-
ticipants could not be classified. In the deliberate condition, four participants applied WADD, 
three participants were LEX users and three participants could not be classified. Hence, there 
was no clear trend that the decision mode is related to a certain information integration strategy.  
Table 2 
Means and Standard Errors for Eye-Tracking Parameters Part 1 and 2 
 
 Part  1
a     Part 2
a 
  3  cues   12  cues  12  cues 
Eye-tracking parameters  INT  DEL  INT  DEL  INT  DEL 
decision time in sec  4.99   6.76     12.82   17.59     8.59    13.06  
single fixation duration in msec  168.35 167.70  177.37 181.20  180.51    185.51 
number of fixations in cue value AOIs  10.35 
(0.85) 
16.11 
(2.50)    34.36 
(2.97) 
51.35 




information inspection index  .79 
(.04) 
.87 
(.02)    .67 
(.02) 
.75 




repeated information inspection score  4.50 
(0.60) 
8.45 
(1.58)    13.26 
(2.14) 
25.57 




SM-index (direction of search)  -0.18 
(0.22) 
-0.41 
(0.23)    -1.38 
(0.51) 
-2.88 





Note. INT = Intuition; DEL = Deliberation. SEs are given in parentheses. Due to log-transformation no SEs are  
reported for decision time and single fixation duration. 
 
aN = 20.  14 
Discussion  
To investigate whether instruction-induced intuition and deliberation are completely distinct 
processes or whether the underlying processes are rather similar, we manipulated the decision 
mode in simple and complex city-size tasks. Significantly lower decision times in the intuitive as 
compared to the deliberate condition indicated that our manipulation was effective according to 
frequently-used manipulation checks.  
In line with interventionist models, the results reveal an astoundingly high similarity of intuition 
and deliberation regarding different measures of fixation duration. First, we found no difference 
in mean fixation duration regarding decision modes. Second, the classification of single fixation 
durations showed an equal distribution of short, medium and long fixations for intuition and de-
liberation. Third, in both decision modes this distribution remained relatively stable in the course 
of decision making. Besides this high similarity regarding fixation duration, the manipulation of 
decision modes influenced several further eye-tracking parameters significantly. Participants in 
the deliberate condition showed a higher number of fixations compared to participants deciding 
intuitively, again supporting interventionist models. Further analyses revealed that the higher 
number of fixations in the deliberate condition is due to a higher percentage of inspected infor-
mation and to more repeated information inspections. Hence, these analyses also support inter-
ventionist models.  
The explorative analysis of information integration provided no evidence that the decision mode 
influences the usage of simplified or complex decision strategies. Due to an incomplete classifi-
cation of participants and the low number of participants, no definite statements concerning ex-
act frequencies of strategy use (i.e., cue-weighting scheme) can be made. Descriptively, in sim-
ple tasks the application of WADD prevailed, whereas in complex tasks many participants could 
not be classified (the results from Part 2 reported below indicate that this difference might have 
been due to the less diagnostic tasks in the complex condition). Interestingly, regardless of com-
plexity conditions, the high amount of inspected information even in the intuitive condition 
rather points to a predominant usage of complex strategies. Regarding the direction of informa-
tion search, deliberation seemed to be associated with a more cue-wise search. Note, however, 
that even in the intuitive condition the search direction was slightly cue-wise. At first sight, these 
findings seem to be inconsistent with the results of the strategy classification, which indicated a 
prevailing application of complex strategies (WADD) that are usually assumed to be associated 
with an option-wise search direction. However, one might speculate that due to the fact that cues 
were not sorted by their validity, information could have been sought in a more cue-wise direc-
tion to save the effort of checking cue labels again. Nevertheless, information could still have 
been integrated according to a weighted additive scheme.  
In Part 1, we investigated how complexity of the decision task as operationalized by number of 
cues influences intuitive and deliberate information processing. In more complex tasks, an in-
creased fixation duration, a higher number of fixations and repeated information inspections, and 
a more cue-wise search pattern was observed compared to simple tasks. However, in contrast to 15 
simple tasks, the percentage of inspected information was lower. These parameters indicate that 
regardless of the decision mode, complex tasks require a higher processing effort that is addi-
tionally underlined by longer decision times with increased complexity. Furthermore, significant 
interactions between Decision Mode and Complexity regarding number of fixations, repeated 
information inspections and direction of information search reveal that the differences between 
intuition and deliberation became more pronounced in complex tasks. It is reasonable to assume 
that more comprehensive supplementary processes are necessary in more complex tasks and that 
participants use them more extensively if they are instructed to deliberate without having time 
constraints.  
As mentioned above, the experiment consisted of two parts which were presented in counterbal-
anced order and separated by a break which gave the participants the possibility to relax. The 
aim of Part 2 was the additional testing of the hypotheses in an enriched decision environment. 
Besides for its immediate practical relevance, legal content was selected because it has been re-
peatedly argued that intuition might play an important role in moral and legal judgments by 
judges as well as lay jurors (Glöckner, 2008; Glöckner & Engel, 2008; Guthrie, Rachlinski, & 
Wistrich, 2007; Hutcheson, 1929; see also Simon, 2004).  
Study – Part 2: Manipulation of Decision Mode in Content-Rich  
Criminal Cases 
Method 
Participants and design. Decision Mode was manipulated between-participants. Participants 
were assigned to the same decision mode condition as in Part 1 and completed 20 complex tasks 
with 12 cues. We did not change participants’ assignment to the decision mode conditions to 
avoid carry-over effects.  
Materials and procedure. The general procedure was very similar to Part 1, except for the fact 
that instead of the classic city-size material content-rich legal inferences were used (see Appen-
dix B). In hypothetical murder cases, participants had to decide which of two suspects was more 
likely to have committed the crime based on probabilistic cues (cf. Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b). 
Pieces of evidence were provided as cues for guilt and could be present (i.e., “plus”) or absent 
(“minus”) for one, both or none of the suspects. Unlike Part 1, the cues were sorted by their 
mean subjective validity, which was assessed in a pre-test. To clearly identify the information 
integration schemes, we designed cue patterns that sufficiently differed in their choice predic-
tions for the strategies WADD, LEX, and EQW. The resulting 20 different cue patterns consti-
tute the within-participants factor Task. Assessment of subjective cue validities, instruction of 
decision mode, and the definition of AOIs was the same as in the complex task condition in Part 
1.  16 
Results 
Our results mainly replicated the findings of the first part of the study in an enriched environ-
ment. All analyses reported below were calculated in correspondence to Part 1, but did not in-
clude the factor Complexity, since only complex 12-cue tasks were used (for all descriptive sta-
tistics, see again Table 2). 
Manipulation check / decision time. Again, intuitive decisions were made significantly faster 
than deliberate ones, indicating the successful manipulation of decision modes, F(1, 18) = 5.16, p 
< .05, η
2 = .22.  
Fixation duration and number of fixations. As in Part 1, we found no difference for mean fixa-
tion duration when comparing the two conditions, F(1, 18.4) = 0.62, p = .44, η
2 = .03, and Deci-
sion Mode did not influence the overall distribution of single fixation durations, χ
2(2; N = 1012) 
= 0.74, p = .69, ŵ
2 = 0.001. Aggregated over intuitive and deliberate decisions, we observed 27 
percent short fixations, 71 percent fixations in the medium time category and only 2 percent long 
fixations (Figure 4). This distribution remained stable over time with the proportion of short fixa-
tion ranging from 20 to 29 percent, medium fixations from 70 to 78 and long fixations from 1 to 
3 percent. Again, participants in the deliberate condition showed a higher number of fixations 
compared to the intuitive condition, F(1, 18) = 4.78, p < .05, η














































Figure 4. Number of short, medium and long fixations averaged across participants and tasks for deci-
sion mode conditions in Part 2. Bar labels indicate the proportion of fixations for each category.  
 
Amount of inspected information and number of repeated inspections. In the more content-rich 
tasks also, participants that had to base their decisions on deliberation examined significantly 
more cue value information than participants deciding intuitively, F(1, 18) = 4.89, p < .05, 
η
2 = .21. In the intuitive condition, about half of the information was inspected, whereas nearly 
two thirds were examined in the deliberate condition. Furthermore, we replicated the finding that 17 
participants in the deliberate condition reexamined cue value information more frequently than 
participants in the intuitive condition, F(1, 18) = 4.93, p < .05, η
2 = .22.  
Direction of information search and information integration strategies. The results concerning 
the SM-index, measuring direction of information search, in tendency replicated the higher cue-
wise search in the deliberate condition, but this difference did not reach conventional signifi-
cance levels, F(1, 18) = 1.90, p = .19, η
2 = .10. Interestingly, in contrast to Part 1, we observed a 
general tendency for more option-wise information search in content-rich tasks. In the intuitive 
condition, the SM-index turned out to be positive, indicating that option-wise search dominated. 
According to the linear scoring rule, for the majority of participants in both decision modes 
choices could best be predicted by a WADD scheme (deliberation: eight of ten participants, in-
tuition: seven of ten participants).  
Discussion 
In Part 2, we aimed to generalize our comparison of deliberate and intuitive decisions by em-
ploying an enriched environment, namely complex legal inference tasks. As in Part 1, we found 
no differences concerning mean fixation duration and overall distribution of fixation duration 
categories (short, medium, long) as well as their distribution over time. Hence, we provide fur-
ther support for interventionist models and validate the assumed similarities between intuitive 
and deliberate decision modes regarding basic information processing across different materials. 
For deliberate decisions, the furthermore hypothesized supplementary cognitive processes could 
also be verified again, as indicated by the differences in number of fixations, amount of in-
spected information and number of repeated information inspections.  
Descriptively, we found a general difference in level for all dependent variables when comparing 
the means of complex tasks in Part 1 and Part 2 of the study (i.e., lower decision times, smaller 
number of fixations, smaller amount of inspected information and less repeated inspections in 
Part 2, cf. Table 2). Also, we observed an increased usage of a WADD scheme for both decision 
modes in Part 2. This can be explained by the more diagnostic decision tasks that allowed us to 
differentiate better between non-compensatory and compensatory strategies (cf. Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008a). Besides, we found a tendency for more option-wise information search, which 
could be due to surface features of the decision task: The cues were sorted according to their va-
lidity and the designed cue patterns were more structured than the ones used in the city-size task. 
Thus, the higher proportion of WADD usage, in contrast to Part 1, was most likely due to the 
fact that we were better able to identify weighted compensatory cue integration in Part 2. Any-
how, we cannot rule out that the presentation format also partially accounts for the effect.  18 
General Discussion 
In recent years, an increasing number of studies comparing intuition and deliberation have been 
published. These studies mainly focused on decision quality and often neglected the specific 
cognitive processes underlying intuitive and deliberate decision modes (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006). We went one step further by examining processes of information search and integration 
using eye-tracking technology. We thereby investigated the general question whether intuitive 
and deliberate decisions are indeed based on completely different and separable processes or 
whether deliberation just adds some additional features to the basic intuitive process as indicated 
by interventionist models. We investigated this research question by manipulating the decision 
mode using different instructions in simple and complex city-size tasks (Part 1), and in complex 
legal inference tasks (Part 2). Hence, we captured a somewhat artificial as well as a more con-
tent-rich setting.  
Altogether, our findings are in line with assumptions of interventionist models. In both parts of 
the study, mean fixation durations and the distribution of short, medium and long fixations were 
equal for intuition and deliberation. The dominance of short and medium fixations indicates that 
quick information scanning prevails over the entire decision process. In contrast to a pattern of 
particularly long fixations observed under the instruction to consciously calculate weighted sums 
(see pre-study, Figure 1), even under the deliberate instruction long fixations that point to a cal-
culation or rule-based, thorough, slow and serial information integration were rarely found. 
Hence, our findings suggest a very similar basic process underlying intuitive and deliberate deci-
sions, namely an automatic process of information integration. Nevertheless, we found some 
crucial differences regarding intuition and deliberation. A higher number of fixations caused by a 
higher amount of inspected information and more repeated information inspections under the 
instruction to deliberate reveal that the basic process of automatic information integration is sup-
plemented by additional processing steps. Hence, deliberation seems to be associated with a 
more thorough and extensive information search. 
Our explorative analyses suggest that deliberation might be associated with a more cue-wise in-
formation search compared to intuition. Whereas deliberation was related to a cue-wise search 
pattern in both parts of the study, intuition resulted in a cue-wise search by trend in Part 1 and in 
a slightly option-wise search in Part 2. Despite these differences in information search pattern, 
we found no evidence that decision mode is related to the application of simplified or complex 
cue-weighting schemes. As indicated by Part 1 and confirmed by Part 2, information is predomi-
nantly integrated according to a WADD scheme regardless of decision mode. However, rela-
tively short decision times and the dominance of short and medium fixation durations indicate 
that even participants deciding deliberately do not apply conscious calculations. Our findings are 
in line with the observation that participants seem to approximate a WADD scheme by using 
automatic processes (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Glöckner & Herbold, 2008).  
Nevertheless, three caveats of our study should be noted. First, our participants were assigned to 
the same decision mode condition in Part 1 and 2 to avoid carry-over effects. Although we coun-19 
terbalanced order, the low number of participants does not allow to analyze order effects relia-
bly. Hence, observations in the two parts were not independent which lowers the validity of the 
within-participants replication of the effects. A second issue is that there are several different 
methods to induce deliberation by instruction (Horstmann et al., in press). We instructed partici-
pants to balance reasons before making a decision. Although this is a well-established method to 
manipulate deliberation, this procedure might induce a specific kind of deliberation. Hence, it is 
not unlikely that the results are partially dependent on the specific wording of the instruction. It 
has to be shown in future studies whether our findings also hold for instructions which highlight 
other aspects of deliberation (e.g., to think carefully and thoroughly). Finally, future research 
should exceed the framework of probabilistic inferences and investigate other types of decision 
tasks because intuition might be task- and context-dependent.  
In conclusion, intuition and deliberation do not seem to be completely distinct processes as im-
plied by the traditional dual-process view. To account for the underlying processes of intuitive 
and deliberate decision-making, models that postulate a common underlying process such as a 
parallel constraint satisfaction mechanism (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; see also Hammond et al., 
1987; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; cf. Rumelhart et al., 1986; Thagard & Millgram, 1995) seem to 
be more suitable. Overall, this study adds to the accumulating body of evidence that automatic 
information integration plays a crucial role in decision making, independent of whether people 
decide intuitively or deliberately. Eye-tracking technology seems to be a promising approach to 
investigate these automatic processes.  
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Appendix A:  
Instructions to manipulate intuitive and deliberate decision modes 
Intuitive Condition  
It is important that you make your decision spontaneously and as fast as possible. This means 
that you should decide intuitively or according to your “gut feeling”. 
Deliberate Condition 
It is important that you balance reasons for both cities (suspects) which speak for or against the 
fact that the city (suspect) is the bigger one (is more likely to have committed the crime). Please 













Appendix B:  
Example of decision tasks and presentation format 
Simple City-Size Task 
 
Complex City-Size Task 
 
Complex Legal Task 
 